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Using stochastic methods we illustrate that the Provisional Irish
Republican Army’s (PIRA) network is clustered along three primary
dimensions: (a) brigade affiliation, (b) whether the member partic-
ipated in violent activities, and (c) task/role within PIRA. While
most brigades tended to foster connections within the brigade (that
is, “closure”), the tendency to do so varied across the organization.
Members who engaged with violent activities were far more likely
to connect with each other; in later periods there is polarization
into those who engage in violent activities and those who do not.
Across brigades, those who engage in a particular task and role
(improvised explosive device [IED] constructor, IED planter, gun-
man, robber/kidnapper/drug smuggler/hijacker) are more likely
to connect with others who do the same task or play the same role
than with other members who fulfill other roles. Standard forms
of homophily (that is, the tendency to make connections with peo-
ple who are similar in terms of demography or status) play a very
© Paul Gill, Jeongyoon Lee, Karl R. Rethemeyer, John Horgan, and Victor Asal
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited. The moral rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
Address correspondence to Paul Gill, University College London, 35 Tavistock Square,
London WC1H 9EZ, United Kingdom. E-mail: paul.gill@ucl.ac.uk
52
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 09
:10
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
14
 
Lethal Connections 53
weak role in explaining which members interact with one another.
Finally, our analysis illustrates clear patterns of relational change
that correspond to changes in the formal structures that PIRA’s
leadership promoted.
KEYWORDS conflict, network analysis, terrorism
Since the earliest work on terrorist movements, two dominant images of
network connections between movement members prevailed. One projects
terrorist organizations as comprised of small, possibly “leaderless,” secretive
cells of individuals who keep to themselves and seek to avoid detection
(Arquilla 1999; Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, 2002; Tsvetovat and Carley 2005;
Tucker 2001). A more recent image is of cells that are loosely connected yet
centrally coordinated, with potentially a hierarchical structure at the high-
est levels (Mishal and Rosenthal 2005). Additionally, Arquilla and Ronfeldt
(2001) suggested that other hybrid structures may be feasible. While recent
efforts have been made to model the most appropriate structure (see Enders
and Su 2007; Lindelauf, Borm, and Hamers 2009), we know of no other
data set that comprehensively captures data on the core membership of a
terrorist organization and analyzes the structures actually formed among the
members. This paper attempts to fill that gap. Below we present a prelim-
inary analysis of data on over 1,384 active Provisional IRA (hereafter PIRA)
members between 1970 and 1998.
Our analysis focuses on several exploratory questions: Why do PIRA
members have relationships with some members of the movement but
not others? What extent do socioeconomic factors like age, education, and
marital status influence relationship formation? How integral are formal struc-
tures, such as brigades, to relational formation? Are there strong tendencies
toward closure and clustering in these networks, or do they tend toward
a hierarchical structure of sorts? Finally, to what extent are certain types
of activity—for instance, improvised explosive device (IED) construction or
planting—related to the propensity to make connections? We will return to
the question of IED activity throughout this paper, as our data was con-
structed to aide in the study of PIRA’s use of IEDs, which long predated the
popular familiarity with the term during the U.S. occupation of Iraq (Gill,
Horgan, and Lovelace 2011).
Enders and Su (2007) and Lindelauf, Borm, and Hamers (2009) suggest
that structural changes in terrorist groups may reflect changes in countert-
errorism tactics. To account for this, we present analyses from four distinct
“phases” of the Northern Irish conflict that correspond to key changes in
PIRA’s strategy and tactics. For each phase we have created exponential
random graph (ERGM) models of the social network data collected for the
period, allowing us to consider both the points of continuity in structure over
time and causes for dynamism in structure.
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54 P. Gill et al.
In order to understand who connects to whom within a terrorist
organization, we build a number of hypotheses based on a series of theoret-
ical perspectives on network connections within licit organizations. Chief
among these theoretical perspectives is homophily—that is, the prefer-
ence for relationships with those who are (more or less) similar across
a number of demographic, status, or affiliation variables, a tendency for
which is found in virtually all social networks (Ibarra 1992; McPherson,
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Additionally, research on “dark networks”
(Milward and Raab 2002) suggests a need for combining closure and hier-
archy to avoid detection to remain part of a coherent effort. Research on
licit activity has long demonstrated that complex undertakings—for instance,
the construction of IEDs or the implementation of coordinated attacks—
may require tighter coordination (Thompson 1967) and thus more tightly
connected “clusters” in networks to complete them successfully. Finally,
though “orthodox” social network theorists have long touted the impor-
tance of viewing networks as determinative of behavior, recent stochastic
work on social networks emphasizes the need to flip the causal arrow
in the other directions—behavior as a determinant of network structure
rather than network structure being determinant of behavior (Snijders,
Steglich, and Schweinberger 2007). These theoretical drivers of network
behavior inform a series of hypotheses regarding the drivers of structural
features in PIRA’s network for each the phases of the conflict. The hypothe-
ses are tested against a unique data set of 1300+ PIRA members. While
there has been much theorizing about terrorist organizational structure,
this is the first study to empirically measure how network connections
were formed and changed over time due to situational and organizational
factors.
PIRA’S SRATEGIC AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
In harmony with recent research on the evolutionary nature of terrorist tac-
tics and networks (Enders and Su 2007; Enders and Sandler 1993; Lindelauf,
Borm, and Hamers 2009; Sandler and Enders 2002), we divided PIRA’s
activities into four distinct phases with both characteristic activities and
characteristic “aspirational” structural features. That is, PIRA, like legitimate
organizations, sought to create a particular set of formal reporting structures
that could be represented on an organizational chart. However, also like
legitimate organizations, the formal structure was paired with an informal
structure that helped to overcome inherent weaknesses, irrationalities, and
impossibilities of imposing an ideal structure on an actual living, breathing
organizational enterprise. The degree to which PIRA realized those struc-
tural aspirations is one question for this study. The four phases are primarily
characterized by critical junctures in PIRA’s history that led to a change in
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Lethal Connections 55
strategy, tactics and structure (Bowyer-Bell 2000; Coogan 2002; English 2003;
Moloney 2002; Patterson 1997; Smith 1997; Taylor 1997). Indeed, previous
research has shown these critical junctures also led to behavioral changes for
PIRA including who was recruited (in terms of age and geographic spread
for example) (Gill and Horgan 2013), how IED attacks were undertaken (Gill
and Horgan 2012) and the group’s propensity to engage in IED attacks (Gill,
Horgan, and Piazza n. d.) and lethal attacks (Asal, Gill, Rethemeyer, and
Horgan in press).
The first phase encapsulates the period 1969–1976. Here, PIRA devel-
oped from a ragtag bunch of urban guerrillas to an Army-like structure with
various brigades, battalions, and companies. Each unit became responsible
for specific geographical combat areas. Indiscriminate violence by all sides
of the conflict marked this period—the most defining moment of which was
“Bloody Sunday” when the paratroop regiment of the British Army shot and
killed 13 innocent civil rights marchers. This was an unprecedented propa-
ganda coup for PIRA and led to mass recruitment and mobilization. Civilian
fatalities attributed to PIRA also peaked during this phase and included the
events of ‘Bloody Friday’ where, in the space of under two hours, 22 IEDs
killed 9 (6 civilians, 2 British soldiers, and 1 member of the Ulster Defence
Association) and injured 130.
During phase one, PIRA’s strategy sought to quickly force British troops
out of Northern Ireland by inflicting a high death toll and substantial eco-
nomic costs in an attempt to sway British public opinion against maintaining
the union with Northern Ireland. By 1977, PIRA’s plans became more long
term and they started plotting a much longer war of attrition that eventually
led to an increased dual emphasis upon mainstream political mobilization
through their political wing, Sinn Fein in parallel with a tactical, increasingly
discriminate “armed struggle.” The urge for this change was borne out of a
mixture of improved British intelligence, war weariness, and attrition. Facing
these problems, PIRA decided a structural change was required that involved
moving from an “outmoded pattern which was proving susceptible to pen-
etration” (Coogan 2002:465). Phase two (1977–1980) therefore embodies the
years of PIRA’s structural change. The blueprint—entitled “Staff Report”—
for this structural change was seized from leading PIRA member Seamus
Twomey in December 1977. The Staff Report’s authors noted the PIRA ranks
“are burdened with an inefficient infrastructure of commands, brigades, bat-
talions and companies. . . We recommend reorganization and remotivation,
the building of a new Irish Republican Army.” Emphasizing a return to
secrecy and stricter discipline, the report created new departments within
the organization (including Education Officers whose job entailed providing
anti-interrogation lectures in conjunction with indoctrination lectures), out-
lined the new cell structure for urban based operations and the command
and functional structures of these new cells, specified the new role for PIRA’s
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56 P. Gill et al.
female and youth wings, instituted a new auxiliary unit to take over policing
duties in Catholic strongholds, and promoted the political wing Sinn Fein to
the forefront (Coogan 2002:465–467). Together, these changes placed far less
emphasis on the quantity of Volunteers and far more emphasis on secrecy
and discipline (Horgan and Taylor 1997). Almost instantly, the effects of
the structural changes were significant. Within a year, 465 fewer charges for
paramilitary offences occurred (Smith 1997:145).
Phase three (1981–1989) was a period of growing politicization of the
Republican movement after the Hunger Strikes. In total, 10 Republicans died
on hunger strike in 1981. PIRA’s Bobby Sands was elected to Westminster
after winning a by-election while on hunger strike. Sympathy for PIRA began
to rise again, and was largely channeled toward the rise of PIRA’s political
wing by organizational elites.
Phase four (1990–1998) incorporates the years of negotiations and the
march toward the final cease-fire and the Good Friday Agreement that
symbolized for many the end of the Northern Ireland conflict.
THEORY
Though the determinants of social network structure have been a focus of
attention in social network analysis since its inception, stochastic techniques
have made it easier to disentangle the effects of node-level characteristics and
dependencies within the data. Our approach focuses on three general areas
of theoretical concern: trust and its relationship to homophily, the influence
of behavior on the proclivity to make connections, and finally roles and tasks
and their tendency to subdivide networks.
Homophily
Homophily is usually defined as similarity between two nodes in a net-
work. Since Aristotle, scholars have noted that “birds of a feather flock
together” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001:417). McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Cook (2001) outline five broad factors that promote homophily;
geography, kinship, organizational affiliation, occupational affiliation, role
relationships, and cognitive processes—including shared knowledge (Carley
1991). Network members tend to prefer homophilous relationships because
“interpersonal similarity increases ease of communication, improves pre-
dictability of behavior, and fosters relationships of trust and reciprocity”
(Ibarra 1993:61). Nooteboom (2006) also found that there is likely a broader
degree of “trustworthiness” endowed in any relationship that exists between
members of a dyad (Nooteboom 2006:250). Homophilous relationships are
a type of heuristic: when there is ambiguity and uncertainty in the environ-
ment, individuals seek to ameliorate it through the shortcut of relationships
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Lethal Connections 57
with similar others with the goal of creating homogenous, easily predicted
networks. When in doubt—or in peril—individuals prefer relationships with
similar others.
Because we are focusing on a relatively homogenous organization,
some forms of homophily cannot be easily probed (for example, differences
in ideology or religious affiliation). Instead, we focus upon demographic
characteristics and organizational affiliation. With respect to demographic
characteristics, we generally expect that two members are more likely to
have a relationship if they are more similar in terms of marital status, edu-
cational attainment, and age at recruitment. Similarly, “brigades” were used
as an organizing structure throughout the period under study. Sharing mem-
bership in one of these subunits is expected to increase the probability that
two members are connected.
H1: Members of the same gender are more likely to connect with one another.
H2: Ties are more likely between two members as their age at recruitment is
more similar.
H3: If two members both attended a university they are more likely to share
a connection.
H4: Members recruited during the same phase of the conflict are more likely
to share a connection.
H5: Members are more likely to make connections within their “home”
brigade than between brigades.
The first five hypotheses conform to general findings regarding “vectors”
for homophily in most social settings, and there is no reason not to expect
them to hold in the context of terrorist organizations. The last two are more
specific to PIRA’s case. Hypothesis 4 suggests there may be cohort effects.
That is, those who are recruited at the same time tend to form relation-
ships during their early training and socialization. There may also be cohort
effects that arise from being recruited during different phases of the conflict.
Brigades are clearly a lasting organizational “foci” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin,
and Cook 2001) for PIRA that may have structured all relationships within the
movement. While organizational foci are a general component in homophily,
PIRA’s brigade structure is specific to it.
Behavioral Similarity
As noted before, most social network research seeks to explain how net-
works structure behavior. However, the work of Snijders and colleagues
refocused on the possibility that behavior shapes network choices. Snijders in
particular has demonstrated through “co-evolution” modeling that, stochas-
tically speaking, behaviors are often implicit in network structure (Mercken
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58 P. Gill et al.
et al. 2010).1 Nagar, Rethemeyer, and Asal’s work on the Jewish Underground
(forthcoming) also demonstrates the degree to which terrorist movements
can be bifurcated by the decision to engage or not engage in violence
as part of the movement. Further, Horgan and Taylor depict two types of
PIRA member, those who are operational and those who are nonopera-
tional. While operational members engage in violent attacks, nonoperational
members provide the support roles of storing and transporting weapons and
providing safehouses (Horgan and Taylor 1997:3). For these reasons, we also
expect PIRA’s network to be affected by whether a member chooses (or is
assigned) to participate in violent activities or not.
PIRA was also split along operational areas on a macroscale. Those
under the leadership of Northern Command typically carried out their duties
in the six counties encompassing Northern Ireland and the five border coun-
ties belonging to the Republic of Ireland. In contrast, those under Southern
Command leadership operated within the other 21 counties of the Republic
of Ireland and typically carried out logistical support operations such as
training, funding, and the storage and movement of weapons.
H6: Members that engage in violence are more likely to have relationships
with others who engage in violence.
H7: Members who eschew violence or are not assigned to participate in violent
activities are more likely to have relationships with others who do not
engage in violence.
H8: Members who engage in violence outside Ireland are more likely to have
relationships with others who engage in violence outside Ireland.
Roles and Tasks
The final set of factors is the importance of roles and tasks to network
connections. Thompson (1967) noted that organizations choose different
organizational forms depending on the nature of production. Thompson out-
lined that the production of simple devices may be accomplished through
routinized procedures with minimal interactions among workers but creation
of complex devices and materials require greater interaction. This fundamen-
tally organizational insight has individual level implications for relationships
among terrorist organization members. This study particularly focuses upon
IED actors for a number of reasons. First, a hallmark of PIRA’s ability to
survive and adapt over time was its substantial technical acumen in its IEDs
(Gill, Horgan, Hunter, and Cushenbery in press). Second, evidence suggests
that PIRA’s structural change indirectly impacted upon the commission of
1Due to the uneven length of the phases, coevolution modeling for this data is not possible. As we will
note later, this is a limitation of our data and findings.
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Lethal Connections 59
IED attacks but not shooting attacks (Gill and Horgan 2012). Third, the grow-
ing threat of IEDs worldwide necessitates a more thorough analysis of IED
networks. Finally, bombings and complex attacks usually require extensive
interaction between team members compared to other terrorist attack types
that require less planning and expertise (Johnson and Braithwaite 2009).
We therefore expect that individuals involved in the IED process would be
organized as highly integrated teams in order to gain the benefits of inten-
sive interaction in the face of greater complexity. Networks involving other
inherently more complex activities (for example, kidnapping, hijacking, bank
robbery, or drug smuggling) are also more likely to be tightly interconnected,
as none of these activities are easily accomplished alone.
Horgan and Taylor (1997) depict PIRA’s command and functional
structure as compartmentalized across strategic, tactical, and organizational
domains. While the Army Council dictates overall military strategy and has
the power to veto various military tactics and operations, another compo-
nent of PIRA’s structure, the General Headquarters (GHQ), is “responsible for
the overall maintenance and conduct of PIRA activities” (Horgan and Taylor
1997:9). GHQ consists of 10 separate departments including Quartermaster,
Security, Operations, Foreign Operations, Finance, Training, Engineering,
Intelligence, Education, and Publicity. These departmental structures in com-
bination with Northern and Southern Command “have as their collective
role the establishment, control, direction, and maintenance of the Provisional
IRA’s Active Service Unit” (Horgan and Taylor 1997:18). Active Service Units
(ASUs) are composed of individuals who directly engage in violent military
operations. As Horgan and Taylor (1997:20) note, ASUs “are generally trained
and designed to specialize in specific tasks, e.g. robberies, shootings, bomb-
ings, internal security, intelligence-gathering on specific targets, etc. . . . This
apparent ‘specialisation’ is an effective tactical and ‘economical’ aspect of
PIRA functional strategy.” These reasons lead to the following hypotheses:
H9: Members who construct IEDs are likely to connect to other IED construc-
tors.
H10: Members who plant IEDs are likely to connect to others who plant IEDs.
H11: Members who engage in bank robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, or drug
smuggling are more likely to connect with others who engage in these
activities.
H12: Members who act as gunmen are no more or less likely to form
connections with other gunmen.
Trust but Verify
Finally, building structures within the movement to contain the damage from
betrayal should still be an important feature of network structure. Network
analysts have focused on the utility of relatively closed network structures
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60 P. Gill et al.
(Coleman 1988, 1990; Coleman and Hoffer 1987). Within such structures one
may monitor behavior and compliance more easily—all members know all
other members and can quickly share information about bad, and good,
behavior (Burt 2005). A number of terrorism scholars (Arquilla 1999; Arquilla
and Ronfeldt 2001, 2002; Tsvetovat and Carley 2005; Tucker 2001) have
sought to put a finer point on the nature and types of structures that
might be prevalent and about how much closure is sufficient. We remain
agnostic about these questions, preferring instead to let the data speak to
us. Our expectation, however, is that a relatively clustered structure should
prevail.
H13: PIRA networks in all phases should demonstrate a tendency toward
clustered network structures.
DATA AND METHODS
This study draws on both longitudinal and cross-sectional data collected
at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Pennsylvania State
University. From this data we derive network structures and the nature of
dependence within them. The PIRA network comprises the following four
types of relationships: (1) involvement in a PIRA activity together, (2) friends
before joining PIRA movement, (3) blood relatives, and (4) related through
marriage. We treated each relation as a tie and coded whether a tie exists
between two members or not. Thus, our PIRA networks have, conceptually
and technically, binary and symmetric relations between members.
In our initial pass through the data we identified over 5,000 poten-
tial nodes. However, through repeated refinements of our data coding
schemes we reduced this list to approximately 2,500 that had known relation-
ships. Then efforts were made to exclude individuals who had sympathized
with PIRA but were not active in the movement. Through this process we
identified a final set of 2,054 PIRA members.
Concurrently, we collected sociological information of members, such
as gender, age, marital status, recruiting age, education (that is, attending
university), brigade memberships, non-/violent characteristics, role-related
characteristics—senior leader, IED constructor, IED planter, and gunman—
and task-related characteristics (that is, foreign operation tasks, and involve-
ment in bank robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, and drugs).
In our first pass through the data we collected sociological data on
roughly 1,300 of the 2,054 members. Data were available for the un-coded
individuals but because the original “actor dictionary” was developed to
include only key PIRA actors and their connections, we triaged the miss-
ing individuals for whom data was uncollected, concentrating on those that
appeared in multiple periods and had at least 5 “connections,” here defined
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Lethal Connections 61
as the sum of incoming and outgoing ties. Our final data set included
sociological data on 1,384 of the 2,054 members (67.4%). The nodes for those
we did not collect sociological data are primarily isolates (no connections),
“pendants” (one connection), “dumb bells” (two individuals that are con-
nected to one another but to no one else), and low-centrality nodes. While
these individuals are undoubtedly important and were perhaps effective
actors within PIRA because of their relative isolation, our primary concern
in this exploratory study is of the actual core network. While our data is not
complete, we believe the network data is comprehensive with respect to the
most important and highly connected members—what could be termed the
core PIRA members.
To see how these members are connected within the networks in detail,
we omitted actors lacking sociological data, and actors completely isolated
from others within the networks. Our rationale is that the former cannot
provide much explanation about their attributes on networking behaviors
and the latter is effectively not part of the network. Table 1 provides summary
statistics on the PIRA network for each Period.
MODELING
Fundamentally, we want to know what factors make it more or less likely a
tie will exist between two members of the network. We used an Exponential
Random Graph Model (ERGM) in order to account for various sources of
dependence in our data, but most especially dependence deriving from
broad social structural tendencies or “pressures” in this domain—for instance,
the need for a friend of a friend to also be a friend if one is to avoid
infiltration by counterterrorism authorities. Our model, thus, includes both
structural variables (for example, preference for alternating k-stars and
k-triangles, which indicate clustering) and those related to homophily (that
is, the tendency for members of PIRA to connect with others who share
certain characteristics). First we provide a brief introduction to Exponential
Random Graph Models (ERGM).
TABLE 1 Deletion Rate Over Identification Processes for the IRA Networks for Each Period
Periods
Number of
members
Number of members
with sociological data
Number of members with
sociological data after deleting
isolates
Period 1 763 (49.80% deletion) →383 (12.79% deletion) →334
Period 2 419 (32.22% deletion) →284 (8.45% deletion) →260
Period 3 897 (37.68% deletion) →559 (5.90% deletion) →526
Period 4 631 (35.66% deletion) →406 (9.60% deletion) →367
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62 P. Gill et al.
ERGM
The nonindependence of observations in social network data causes
conventional statistical inference to underestimate the true sampling vari-
ability (Wasserman and Faust 1994) and thus generate parameters that are
biased and inefficient. A number of researchers proposed using an ERGM,
also known as a p∗ model, to overcome the inherent issue of depen-
dence (Robins, Pattison, et al. 2007; Frank and Strauss 1986; Pattison and
Wasserman 1999; Robins, Pattison, and Wasserman 1999). We utilize Frank
and Strauss’ (1986) variant of ERGM, a Markov random graph model which
proposes that a random graph of a particular network follows a Markov
graph when the probability of ties between disjoint pairs of actors are ran-
dom (that is, independent) given the rest of the graph consisting of certain
conditionally dependent ties (that is, a tie from i to j is conditionally depen-
dent, only on other possible ties involving i and/or j) (Robins, Pattison, et al.
2007).
Recent advances in Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood esti-
mation (MCMCMLE) allow us to obtain more accurate parameter estimates
through a simulation technique (Robins, Snijders, et al. 2007). Here, we
used Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis (also known
as SIENA), an open source software package that relies on the MCMCMLE
technique, to analyze our sociometric data (for an introduction to stochas-
tic social network analysis, see Snijders 2001; Robins, Snijders, et al. 2007;
Snijders 2002, 2005; Snijders and Duijn 2002). We also used UCINET (Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman 2002) to calculate deterministic statistics and NetDraw
(Borgatti 2002) to create network visualizations.
Modeling Procedure
After parameters are generated through a simulation process, t-ratios for each
are generated to assess the degree of fit between the model and the actual
data. A sufficient model has little or no divergence from the actual data, so we
actually wish to find t-ratios that are as close to zero as possible (that is, the
actual value and the modeled value should be statistically indistinguishable
from one another). If the model parameters’ t-ratios approach zero, then
the model is said to have “converged” sufficiently to trust the results. The
models reported in Tables 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 have t-ratios less than 0.1, which
experience indicates is an acceptable degree of convergence (Snijders et al.
2007).
Second, the goodness-of-fit of each model is examined using SIENA
(for more detailed information about interpretation of goodness-of-fit of an
ERGM, please see Snijders et al. 2007). The joint goodness-of-fit tests for all
models in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 were significant at 1% level, which indicates
that these models fit the PIRA networks very well.
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Lethal Connections 63
Third, each parameter is then assessed as to whether each variable has
explanatory power in the model. Here, a series of goodness of fit tests with
one degree of freedom are run for each parameter. The threshold of signif-
icance is the standard 5% or 10% levels. Variables were repeatedly added
and removed through an exploratory and iterative model selection process.
As a result, the final models are presented in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5. The pro-
cedure also generates a set of standard errors that allow for calculation of
“traditional” t-ratios to assess the statistical significance of each variable.
FINDINGS
Our analysis finds that while all four periods are somewhat structurally
idiosyncratic, there are a number of regularities, including several dimensions
of homophily, the importance of violent activity as a shaper of structural rela-
tionships, and the salience of brigades and role/task structure to relationship
formation and maintenance. Our modeling also validates past findings of
Horgan and Taylor (1997) by discovering major structural evolutions.
The stochastic results using SIENA account for homophily arising from
similarity across demographic characteristics, brigade membership, proclivity
to engage in violence, and roles or tasks individuals assume or under-
take. SIENA’s results are similar to a multinomial probability model, so the
parameter estimates should be treated like other logit models—the sign
and significance may be directly interpreted but the magnitude may not
be. However, SIENA differentiates two effects by using unidirectional and
symmetric data—actor and similarity—for each attribute, such as gender,
whereas, the three effects—ego, alter, and similarity—for each attribute are
differentiated by employing directional and symmetric data. Actor related
covariates indicate that actors with a high value for an attribute (for exam-
ple, members who are violent are coded as 1, while others are coded as
0) tend to make ties more quickly than others. Similarity-related covariates
indicate that actors tend to have ties with similar actors more often—for
instance, there is a tendency for women to create relationships with other
women rather than with men.
Period 1
Table 2 reports the final model for Period 1 resulting from our analysis
and presents a reduced set of variables found to have jointly significant
coefficients in the model.
With respect to the structural effects for Period 1, the negative and sig-
nificant coefficient on alternating k-star suggested that PIRA’s network is not
dominated by a few nodes with high degree, where a “high degree” node is
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64 P. Gill et al.
TABLE 2 MCMCMLE of IRA Network (Period 1)
Parameters Est. S.E. t value
Structural
Configuration
Alternating K-stars −0.2320 0.1131 −2.05∗∗
Altering K-triangles
Demographic
Information
Gender (Female =1) 0.6220 0.2602 2.39∗∗
Same Gender (Female =1) 0.6944 0.3003 2.31∗∗
University 0.5858 0.3841 1.53
Same University 0.4641 0.4076 1.14
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.1768 0.1137 1.55
Same Marital Status 0.5020 0.1046 4.80∗∗∗
Recruiting Age 0.0101 0.0074 1.36
Recruiting Age Similarity 1.7434 0.7150 2.44∗∗
Brigade
Membership
Antrim Brigade −0.4086 0.0900 −4.54∗∗∗
Same Antrim Brigade 1.2042 0.134 8.99∗∗∗
Derry Brigade −0.5991 0.3161 −1.90∗
Same Derry Brigade 0.2491 0.3392 0.73
Armagh Brigade −0.2533 0.2693 −0.94
Same Armagh Brigade 0.5928 0.3099 1.91∗
Down Brigade −2.2266 0.5802 −3.84∗∗∗
Same Down Brigade −1.4658 0.5384 −2.72∗∗∗
Tyrone Brigade −0.2976 0.2324 −1.28
Same Tyrone Brigade 0.3964 0.2685 1.48
Fermanagh Brigade
Same Fermanagh Brigade
NonViolent/Violent
Characteristics
Violent 0.3266 0.3665 0.89
Same violent 0.7537 0.1679 4.49∗∗∗
Non-violent 0.1391 0.3423 0.41
Same non-violent −0.0474 0.3524 −0.13
Violent in Foreign
Operation
Same violent in Foreign
Operation
0.9023 0.4072 2.22∗∗
Roles/Tasks Senior Leaders 1.4162 0.2453 5.77∗∗∗
Same Senior Leaders 0.2196 0.2568 0.86
Gunman 0.2543 0.3790 0.67
Same Gunman 0.8855 0.2196 4.03∗∗∗
IED Constructor 0.4347 0.4030 1.08
Same IED Constructor 0.8577 0.2883 2.98∗∗∗
IED Planter 0.0029 0.3633 0.01
Same IED Planter 0.5285 0.1721 3.07∗∗∗
Foreign Operation
Same Foreign Operations 0.0810 0.3524 0.23
Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.5863 0.3386 1.73∗
Same Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
1.8042 0.3816 4.73∗∗∗
MCMCMLE = Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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Lethal Connections 65
one with many connections relative to most other members. Instead, “nodes
tend not to be hubs [and there is] smaller variance between the degrees”
(Robins et al. 2007:198) for this Period. This finding suggests that there is
more than one core (for example, multiple clusters) within the network dur-
ing this emerging Period. Our findings regarding brigades and roles/tasks
help define what clusters tended to form.
We also examined how characteristics of the members and their brigade
affiliation affect propensity to make connections. The variables included in
this analysis are: (1) demographic information about the individuals, (2) their
brigade membership, (3) whether the member engaged in violent activities,
and (4) roles/tasks the member undertook. In particular, we expected to find
PIRA members would generally operate in homophilous networks—that is,
they would preferentially create connections to people who are demograph-
ically similar—similar in brigade membership, similar in their propensity for
violence, and/or similar in role/task.
The stochastic analysis of Period 1 suggests that this network is strongly
homophilous in several dimensions. Starting with demographic characteris-
tics, two were significant: gender (5% level of significance) and marital status
(1% level of significance). Our gender variable is “1” if the member is female.
That is, there is a tendency for PIRA members to sort by gender (female vs.
male) and by marital status (married vs. unmarried status). Also, the coef-
ficients on “gender” and “age at recruitment” are significant at the 5% and
10% levels, respectively. These findings imply that (1) female members and
(2) members who were older at recruitment tend to have more connections,
on average, than male members or younger members.
Second, brigade membership tended to structure network connections.
The coefficients on “Same Antrim brigade” and “Same Armagh brigade” are
positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. These imply a
higher tendency for members in both Antrim and Armagh brigades to make
ties within their brigade than with members of other brigades. In particu-
lar, given the negative and significant coefficient on “Antrim brigade” (1%
level of significance) and relatively large magnitude of coefficient on the
“Same Antrim brigade” (coefficient = 1.2032), a member who belongs to
the Antrim brigade seems to be particularly likely to make connections only
within Antrim, whereas members of other brigades are somewhat more likely
to connect between brigades. By contrast, the Down brigade seems to be
poorly integrated. The negative and significant coefficient on “Same Down
brigade” at the 1% significance level suggests that Down brigade members
have a propensity to create ties with members of other brigades, which leads
to a heterogeneous Down brigade network.
Third, our results suggest that members’ engagement in violence influ-
ences the formation of clusters or tightly interconnected groups within this
network. The coefficients on “Same violent” and “Same violent in foreign
operation” are positive and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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66 P. Gill et al.
Members who engage in violence tend to have relationships with other
violent members in both operational areas.
Fourth, we expected that individual roles/tasks help to explain
the networking patterns between PIRA members. Four roles/tasks-based
homophiles were found within this network (all coefficients are positive and
significant at 1% level of significance): (1) IED constructors, (2) IED planters,
(3) gunmen, and (4) members who have committed crimes (bank robbery,
kidnapping, hijacking or drugs). Members engaged in these activities all
tended to cluster together.
Period 2
Table 3 reports Period 2’s model with a reduced set of variables, which were
tested to be jointly significant.
For Period 2, our results do not show any statistically significant struc-
tural configurations. However, the sign of coefficient on alternating k-stars
has changed from negative during Period 1 to positive during Period 2,
despite its statistical insignificance (t = 0.48). This structural change may
imply the emergence of a hub within the network—that is, one or a few
highly connected individuals who help to create linkages across the entire
network. This would suggest—but not strongly—that the Period 2 network
was more centralized than period one’s network.
Again we focus on four dimensions: (1) demographic information,
(2) brigade memberships, (3) engagement in violence, and (4) roles/tasks.
First, as shown in Table 3, the coefficients on “Same marital status” and
“Recruiting age similarity” are significant at the 1% level. Both are strong
predictors of tie formations over Period 2. That is, married PIRA members
have a strong preference for making more connections with other married
activists than with unmarried ones (see the coefficient on “Same marital sta-
tus”). Also, members seek others who have been recruited at similar ages to
develop their PIRA networking behaviors (see the coefficient on “Recruiting
age similarity”). This finding suggests that cohorts developed in the move-
ment: connections are more likely between members recruited at the same
time and less likely between cohorts recruited at different times. This has
important implications for the flow of information and expertise within the
movement, as it suggests some in-built biases against creating inter-cohort
links that would facilitate transfer of knowledge from relatively experienced
members to relatively inexperienced members.
Second, we found that three brigades were more strongly integrated
than others. The coefficients on “Same Antrim brigade,” “Same Derry
brigade,” and “Same Armagh brigade,” which are all positive and significant
at the 1% level, suggest a preference for connections within brigade and thus
a greater degree of clustering and closure in these brigades. Given the pos-
itive and significant coefficients on “Derry brigade” and “Armagh brigade,”
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Lethal Connections 67
TABLE 3 MCMCMLE of IRA Network (Period 2)
Parameters Est. S.E. t value
Structural
Configuration
Alternating K-stars 0.0481 0.1075 0.45
Altering K-triangles
Demographic
Information
Gender (Female =1) 0.6427 0.3067 2.10∗∗
Same Gender (Female =1) 0.4811 0.3500 1.37
University −0.1833 0.5110 −0.36
Same University −0.1668 0.5275 −0.32
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.0619 0.1291 0.48
Same Marital Status 0.5166 0.1142 4.52∗∗∗
Recruiting Age 0.0288 0.0064 4.50∗∗∗
Recruiting Age Similarity 2.5332 0.5934 4.27∗∗∗
Brigade
Membership
Antrim Brigade −0.0782 0.0913 −0.86
Same Antrim Brigade 0.6271 0.1359 4.61∗∗∗
Derry Brigade 0.4627 0.1082 4.28∗∗∗
Same Derry Brigade 1.0333 0.1746 5.92∗∗∗
Armagh Brigade 0.6033 0.163 3.70∗∗∗
Same Armagh Brigade 1.2031 0.2567 4.69∗∗∗
Down Brigade −1.6762 0.4815 −3.48∗∗∗
Same Down Brigade −1.3737 0.4272 −3.22∗∗∗
Tyrone Brigade
Same Tyrone Brigade
Fermanagh Brigade
Same Fermanagh Brigade
NonViolent/Violent
Characteristics
Violent 0.5093 0.1933 2.63∗∗∗
Same violent 0.6905 0.1557 4.43∗∗∗
Non-violent 0.0394 0.2989 0.13
Same non-violent 0.0984 0.2994 0.33
Violent in Foreign
Operation
Same violent in Foreign
Operation
0.1328 0.3836 0.35
Roles/Tasks Senior Leaders
Same Senior Leaders
Gunman −0.0584 0.1948 −0.30
Same Gunman 0.2809 0.1667 1.69∗
IED Constructor
Same IED Constructor
IED Planter 0.1999 0.1874 1.07
Same IED Planter 0.5405 0.1645 3.29∗∗∗
Foreign Operation
Same Foreign Operations 1.3851 0.3576 3.87∗∗∗
Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.5314 0.287 1.85∗
Same Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.6801 0.3016 2.25∗∗
MCMCMLE = Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation.
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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68 P. Gill et al.
these two brigades may be particularly integrated. Members in Derry and
Armagh made more connections on average than members of other brigades
and also tended to make those connections within the brigade. Consistent
with our Period 1 finding, Down brigade members were still more likely
to make heterogeneous ties, expressing a preference for connections with
members from other brigades in Period 2.
Third, violent members tend to make more connections with other vio-
lent members during Period 2 (see the coefficient on “Same Violent,” t =
4.46). Also, since violent members are more likely to create ties with others
than those who are not violent (see the coefficient on “Violent,” t = 2.65),
the Period 2 network has a strong tendency to build interconnected groups
between violent members. As in Period 1, there is a general tendency for
members to sort into violent and nonviolent subgroups.
Fourth, our results indicate that as in Period 1, there is a tendency
for PIRA members to sort by roles/tasks, such as “gunman,” “IED planter,”
“Foreign Operations,” and “Involvement in bank robbery, kidnapping, hijack-
ing, and drugs.” The coefficients on “Same gunman” and “Same IED planter”
are positive and significant at 10% and 1% levels, respectively. Likewise, the
coefficients on “Same Foreign Operations” and “Same involvement in bank
robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, and drugs” are positive and significant at 1%
and 5% levels, respectively.
Period 3
Table 4 presents the final model for Period 3 (1981–1989) with a reduced set
of variables that were found to have significant coefficients. Since the net-
work for Period 3 has the largest number of members of all Periods, it shows
more active and interesting dynamics of members’ networking behaviors
than any other observed Period network.
Regarding structural features of this network, the coefficient on alter-
nating k-stars is positive and significant at 1% significance level. Period 3’s
network tends to exhibit a high proportion of higher order stars. This struc-
ture, together with the negative density parameter, represents “connections
between a larger number of low degree nodes and a smaller number of
higher degree nodes, akin to a core-periphery structure” (Robins, Snijders,
et al. 2007:198). That is, there is a higher degree of centralization in this net-
work than in Periods 1 and 2. Nevertheless, our brigade findings also suggest
a strong tendency to relate within brigades, which further suggests a control
structure: a small core group of leaders that connected and coordinated the
brigades.
Turning now to the same set of four variables we examined for Periods
1 and 2, Period 3 demonstrates some of the same connection by homophily
found before. As in Periods 1 and 2, the coefficients on “Same Gender” and
“Same Marital Status” are positive and significant at the 1% level. The PIRA
networks are structured by gender and marital status.
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Lethal Connections 69
TABLE 4 MCMCMLE of IRA Network (Period 3)
Parameters Est. S.E. t value
Structural
Configuration
Alternating K-stars 0.5866 0.0632 9.28∗∗∗
Altering K-triangles
Demographic
Information
Gender (Female =1) 0.4672 0.1451 3.22∗∗∗
Same Gender (Female =1) 0.4912 0.1807 2.72∗∗∗
University 0.2763 0.1795 1.54
Same University 0.2294 0.2067 1.11
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.1668 0.0563 2.96∗∗∗
Same Marital Status 0.2065 0.0613 3.37∗∗∗
Recruiting Age −0.0002 0.0037 −0.05
Recruiting Age Similarity −0.0008 0.2908 0.00
Brigade
Membership
Antrim Brigade 0.1363 0.042 3.25∗∗∗
Same Antrim Brigade 0.8981 0.0807 11.13∗∗∗
Derry Brigade 0.3463 0.0552 6.27∗∗∗
Same Derry Brigade 0.9362 0.1125 8.32∗∗∗
Armagh Brigade 0.3537 0.1205 2.94∗∗∗
Same Armagh Brigade 0.6307 0.1726 3.65∗∗∗
Down Brigade −2.7699 0.2754 −10.06∗∗∗
Same Down Brigade −2.655 0.2464 −10.78∗∗∗
Tyrone Brigade 0.6908 0.0814 8.49∗∗∗
Same Tyrone Brigade 1.0811 0.1425 7.59∗∗∗
Fermanagh Brigade
Same Fermanagh Brigade
NonViolent/Violent
Characteristics
Violent 0.2628 0.0884 2.97∗∗∗
Same violent 0.2512 0.0799 3.14∗∗∗
Non-violent
Same non-violent
Violent in Foreign
Operation
Same violent in Foreign
Operation
Roles/Tasks Senior Leaders
Same Senior Leaders
Gunman −0.0589 0.0901 −0.65
Same Gunman 0.3845 0.0909 4.23∗∗∗
IED Constructor
Same IED Constructor 0.3891 0.1368 2.84∗∗∗
IED Planter 0.049 0.0937 0.52
Same IED Planter 0.3165 0.0967 3.27∗∗∗
Foreign Operation
Same Foreign Operations 0.4583 0.0958 4.78∗∗∗
Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.5716 0.0938 6.09∗∗∗
Same Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.7368 0.1354 5.44∗∗∗
MCMCMLE = Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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70 P. Gill et al.
Second, during Period 3, three brigades—Antrim, Derry, and Armagh
brigade—tend to develop strong membership-based cliques. As shown in
Table 4, the coefficients on “Same Antrim brigade,” “Same Derry brigade,”
and “Same Armagh brigade” are all positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level. At the same time, the coefficients on “Antrim brigade,” “Derry
brigade,” and “Armagh brigade” are also all positive and significant at the 1%
level. However, the negative and significant coefficients on “Down brigade”
and “Same Down brigade” confirm that there is a high likelihood for the
Down brigade not to form ties with those who have the same brigade
memberships within the PIRA network.
Once again the network demonstrated a tendency to segment by use
of violence. Violent members tended to have more connections, and those
connections tended to be to other violent members (see the coefficients on
“Violent” and “Same violent” at 5% and 1% levels, respectively).
Fourth, we also found a strong tendency toward homophily by
roles/tasks within the network. The coefficients on “Same Gunman,” “Same
IED Planter,” “Same Foreign Operations,” and “Same Involvement in bank
robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, and drugs” are all positive and significant at
1% levels.
Period 4
Table 5 reports the final model for Period 4 (1990–1998), which includes a
set of predictors for this PIRA network.
During Period 4 the highly centralized structure built in Period 3 was
largely dismantled, as evidenced by the positive and insignificant coefficient
on alternating k-star (t = 0.27).
Also, we found the relative withering of homophily as a motive force
behind relational choices as compared to the first three Periods. First, PIRA’s
network for Period 4 is homophilous only with respect to three demographic
attributes: education (see the positive and significant coefficient on “Same
university” at 5% level, t = 2.56), age at recruiting (see the positive and
significant coefficient on “Recruiting age similarity” at the 5% level, t = 2.38),
and marital status (see the positive and significant coefficients on “Same
marital status” at 1% level, t = 5.33).
Second, compared to the strong brigade-based structural features in
Period 3, only the Antrim brigade has a high tendency to create new ties
with one another based on the homophily of brigade membership (see the
positive and significant coefficients on “Same Antrim brigade” at 1% level,
t = 6.11).
Third, violence is no longer the factor that helps to explain denser
patterns of connection. Instead, nonviolence is a better predictor of con-
nection. The coefficients on “Nonviolent” and “Same nonviolent” are all
positive and significant at the 1% level. The nonviolent members tend to have
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Lethal Connections 71
TABLE 5 MCMCMLE of IRA Network (Period 4)
Parameters Est. S.E. t value
Structural
Configuration
Alternating K-stars 0.0285 0.0926 0.31
Altering K-triangles
Demographic
Information
Gender (Female =1) 0.0797 0.3655 0.22
Same Gender (Female =1) 0.1606 0.3941 0.41
University 0.3023 0.187 1.62
Same University 0.5584 0.2272 2.46∗∗
Marital Status (Married =1) 0.1138 0.1158 0.98
Same Marital Status 0.4941 0.0934 5.29∗∗∗
Recruiting Age 0.0043 0.0051 0.84
Recruiting Age Similarity 1.1381 0.4777 2.38∗∗
Brigade
Membership
Antrim Brigade 0.0237 0.0803 0.30
Same Antrim Brigade 0.7106 0.1134 6.27∗∗∗
Derry Brigade 0.1057 0.2062 0.51
Same Derry Brigade 0.0529 0.2192 0.24
Armagh Brigade −0.0988 0.1856 −0.53
Same Armagh Brigade 0.1205 0.2053 0.59
Down Brigade
Same Down Brigade
Tyrone Brigade 0.0303 0.214 0.14
Same Tyrone Brigade 0.0801 0.2242 0.36
Fermanagh Brigade
Same Fermanagh Brigade
NonViolent /Violent
Characteristics
Violent 0.1474 0.1619 0.91
Same violent 0.2177 0.107 2.03∗∗
Non-violent 0.4846 0.1302 3.72∗∗∗
Same non-violent 0.7401 0.1469 5.04∗∗∗
Violent in Foreign
Operation
−0.1732 0.1759 −0.98
Same violent in Foreign
Operation
0.1762 0.2016 0.87
Roles/Tasks Senior Leaders
Same Senior Leaders
Gunman 0.0848 0.155 0.55
Same Gunman 0.5653 0.1263 4.48∗∗∗
IED Constructor 0.3274 0.2376 1.38
Same IED Constructor 0.5012 0.2424 2.07∗∗
IED Planter −0.0162 0.1591 −0.10
Same IED Planter 0.1369 0.1205 1.14
Foreign Operation 0.5375 0.1398 3.84∗∗∗
Same Foreign Operations 0.8517 0.1625 5.24∗∗∗
Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.1588 0.1588 1.00
Same Involvement in bank
robbery/kidnapping/
hijacking/drugs
0.5097 0.1874 2.72∗∗∗
MCMCMLE = Markov Chain Monte Carlo maximum likelihood estimation.
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
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72 P. Gill et al.
relationships with one another during Period 4. The tendency for violent
members to network with one another diminished.
However, roles/tasks still help to explain relationships in the network:
(1) gunmen (positive and significant at 1% level), (2) IED constructors (pos-
itive and significant at 5% level), (3) members who work for the foreign
operation (see the positive and significant coefficients on “Foreign opera-
tion” and “Same foreign operation” at 1% level), and (4) members who have
committed crimes (bank robbery, kidnapping, hijacking, or drugs) all are
more likely to connect with others having the same roles/tasks.
DISCUSSION
Our modeling suggests that there are some important points of continuity
in relational structure within PIRA, even as the organization was shaped by
the leadership over time and evolved through membership turnover. Period
4 is quite different—and understandably so, given the transformative nego-
tiations that were transpiring during this time. We found four broad drivers
of relational structure. First, homophily was less important as a structuring
device than was anticipated, with the very notable exception of homophily
by brigade (Hypothesis 5). The brigade structure was an important cluster-
ing feature throughout, though members were more likely to connect within
some brigades than others. The clustering tendency was strongest in the
Antrim brigade. The Armagh brigade also possessed a strong cluster feature,
but only through the first three periods. Interestingly, the Down brigade over
the first three periods played an opposite role: its members tended to be less
connected and also tended to make connections beyond the brigade, sug-
gesting a less cohesive structure than found in other brigades, but especially
in Antrim and Armagh.
The other forms of homophily were only weakly supported. Periods
1 and 3 showed some gender sorting, and the coefficient on gender was
always positive. Thus Hypothesis 1 is weakly supported. Age similarity
(Hypothesis 2) was only significant in the third period, so it is not supported.
Similarly, university attendance was only significant in the fourth period, so
Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Finally, recruiting age similarity fluctuates.
It is not significant in Period 1, which is not surprising given the movement
was just getting under way: there was insufficient time for a cohort effect
to take hold. Thereafter, recruiting age similarity (Hypothesis 4) was positive
in Periods 2 and 4 and negative in Period 3. The Period 3 result suggests
efforts were made either centrally or individually through a broad cultural
shift to integrate old members with new recruits. Our results suggest a more
nuanced consideration of cohort effects—one that must consider whether
there are efforts from central leadership to steer the organization in a more
integrated direction.
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Lethal Connections 73
Our modeling unearthed one unanticipated source of homophily: mar-
ital status. In all four periods, similarity of marital status was positive and
significant. Given that we have controlled for age at recruitment and for
participation in violence, marital status is not a proxy for either. One could
assume that married people are somewhat older (and thus confounded with
age) and married people may avoid violence due to family commitments
(and thus confounded with willingness to engage in violence). Instead, mar-
ital status may be preference for a certain level of maturity—or lack of
recklessness—among ones’ peers in the movement. So the two most con-
sistent homophilous tendencies are through brigade and marital status, with
gender a weaker force.
With respect to behavioral similarity, the results found strong differen-
tiation between the violent and nonviolent members. Per Hypothesis 5, the
violent members of PIRA tended to be connected to one another, and in two
of the four periods the violent members tended to have more connections
overall. The nonviolent members were not particularly likely to connect, con-
trary to Hypothesis 7—until Period 4, when the groundwork for a negotiated
settlement was being put in place.
Regarding violent operations outside Ireland, in Period 1 participation
therein provided a basis for connection (per Hypothesis 8) but that was
not true in other periods. Our findings regarding Hypothesis 7 and 8 again
speak to the need to understand the evolving nature of the Northern Ireland
conflict and how that was reflected in the PIRA relational structures that
manifested. Turning to roles and tasks, there is very strong evidence that role
and task assignment explains relational structure. In fact, the effect was even
stronger than we expected. Hypotheses 9, 10, and 11 are largely supported
(see Table 6).
Hypothesis 11 is completely supported, with those engaged in kidnap-
ping, robbery, hijacking, and/or drug smuggling being much more likely to
share a connection with peers engaged in the same activity. The same is
largely true of the IED planters and constructors. IED planters have a strong
tendency to connect in three periods and weaker but still positive tendency
in Period 4. IED constructors are strongly connected in three of the four
periods; the lack of a finding for Period 2 may be the results of missing data.
TABLE 6 Roles and Task—Patterns of Statistical Significance
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Gunmen X X X X
IED constructors X X X
IED planters X X X ∗
Foreign operations ∗ X X X
Kidnapping, robbery, etc. X X X X
X = statistically significant.
∗Positive coefficient but not statistically significant.
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To dwell on the IED findings for a moment, the results suggest a rela-
tively closed, cellular structure that separated constructors from planters. Our
stochastic analysis found no particular tendency for planters and construc-
tors to connect, but our visualizations find what one would expect among
clandestine cells: relative closure with a few bridges that were necessary to
coordinate activities between the constructors and planters.
Hypothesis 12 was not supported: gunmen were also much more likely
to connect with one another.
Finally, our expectations about general tendencies toward clustering
(Hypothesis 13) were not supported. While Period 3 demonstrated clustering,
Periods 1, 2, and 4 did not. Rather than generalized clustering, there appears
to be much more important brigade and task-based clustering. Network
closure—needed to ensure that a friend of a friend is a friend—was achieved
through brigade structure and roles/tasks.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, our results suggest that PIRA’s relational structure over
time was consistently influenced by three primary factors: brigade member-
ship, engagement/nonengagement in violence, and task/role. In fact, one
might think of an exploration of this structure as a three-step decision tree:
(1) Which brigade does a person belong to? (2) Do they engage in violence?
(3) If they engage in violence, what was their task or role? Layered over
this decision tree are a few other homophilous influences: a strong prefer-
ence for marital status sorting, a weaker but probably significant tendency
for gender sorting, and sorting by recruitment cohorts that may have been
interrupted by senior leadership decisions regarding PIRA’s general structure.
The network data suggests that PIRA leadership interventions to reorganize
and restructure the movement “worked” in that structures shifted over time
in ways that accord with the known organizational intention of that leader-
ship. In the end our analysis suggests a relatively hierarchical structure with
a clear division of labor—as any “traditional” business or nonprofit would
generally have.
It is important to note a caveat about our findings: though it was
not our intention to do so, our results are not generalizable to all terror-
ists or IED networks. Our results found some effects that are so prevalent
or strong that they could not have been generated by random chance in
these networks. The results are thus generalizable to current and poten-
tially future states of these networks but not necessarily other terrorist
networks. However we believe these results are indicative of what we might
find in other terrorist networks and may provide an important, general-
ized blueprint for how terrorists construct cells for IED operations within
the context of a large, well-structured organization. A deeper examination
of these dynamics may also carry significant operational implications for
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counterterrorism agencies that seek to embed individual informants within a
wider network of members.
Perhaps, the finding that common brigade membership predicts con-
nection is not surprising considering that brigade membership was geo-
graphically assigned and located within Northern Ireland. This leaves us
with the question of whether the fact that Brigade membership matters is a
result of opportunity or proximity. While this question remains unanswered,
future studies using this data may make use of GIS software to measure the
distance between the nodes’ home addresses. Recent studies have utilized
GIS to show the spatio-temporal clustering of terrorist attacks (LaFree et al
2012; Johnson and Braithwaite 2009; Braithwaite and Johnson 2012) and the
distance-to-crime correlates of IED attacks (Gill and Horgan 2012) and sui-
cide bombings (Gill 2012). We believe that such an approach would lead
to a more precise and focused understanding into how geography impacts
upon network formation.
Finally, this research also serves to illuminate what is capable from
open-source data collection endeavors. The extent and depth of the net-
work coupled with the layering of attributional data represents, in our view,
a major step forward for the social network analysis of terrorist networks.
While replication studies of other terrorist organizations may prove to be
more cumbersome due to language barriers or access to relevant open-
source reporting, we believe that comparative studies that replicate our
methodology are important and realizable particularly for Western-based
networks.
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